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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the early experience of non-employment has a causal
impact on workers’ subsequent career. The analysis is based on a sample of low
educated youth graduating between 1994 and 2002 in Flanders (Belgium). To correct
for selective incidence of non-employment, we instrument early non-employment by
the provincial unemployment rate at graduation. Since the instrument is clustered at
the province-graduation year level and the number of clusters is small, inference is
based on wild bootstrap methods. We find that one percentage point increase in the
proportion of time spent in non-employment during the first two and a half years of the
career decreases annual earnings from salaried employment six years after graduation
by 10% and annual hours worked by 7% (unconditional effects). Thus, any policy that
prevents unemployment in the first place will be beneficial. In addition, curative
policies at the micro level may be required, depending on the actual cause of the scar.
JEL Classifications: J31; J64
Keywords: Youth unemployment; Scars; Instrumental variable; Wild bootstrap
1 Introduction
High levels of youth unemployment are a great concern for policy makers, especially since
the start of the Great Recession (Bell and Blanchflower 2010). However, unemployment
rates are typically higher for young workers than for older ones. This is understandable
since younger workers have the least experience and hence are often the easiest to remove.
Moreover, they lose or leave a job more often than older workers because job shopping
helps them to find a good match (Gervais et al. 2014). For instance, Topel and Ward
(1992) find that two thirds of job changes and wage growth occur in the first ten years
of workers’ career. This initial high turnover may involve also short spells in unemploy-
ment. Thus, youth unemployment need not be necessarily detrimental to workers’ career
if it is part of the process of finding stable employment. Other views predict that the
experience of youth unemployment may entail long-term penalties in terms of reduced
wages and persistent unemployment. These results are explained by human capital loss
(Pissarides 1992), whichmay arise from the depreciation of existing capital as well as from
forgone work experience (Ellwood 1982). Another explanation comes from the signaling
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model in which past unemployment records are interpreted by employers as signals of
low productivity in a context of imperfect information (Lockwood 1991).
Therefore, whether the early experience of non-employment entails long-term reper-
cussions on youth’s career should be assessed empirically. Our study addresses this
research question for Flanders, the most prosperous of the three Belgian regions. The
results of this analysis have important policy implications: namely, if the early experience
of non-employment does not generate a scar on later labour market outcomes, there is no
need for any policy intervention, since workers are themselves able to eliminate any neg-
ative impact on their career. By contrast, if it inflicts serious scarring effects, any policy
that prevents unemployment in the first place will be beneficial.
Belgium is an interesting case because it has one of themost rigid labourmarkets among
the OECD countries (Kawaguchi and Murao 2014).1 A related literature suggests that
young graduates are more exposed to adverse labour market conditions at graduation in
a rigid labour market than in a flexible one and that this exposure translates into more
persistent penalties (e.g. Genda et al. 2010). Thus, we expect that, in Belgium, the early
experience of non-employment inflicts large and long-lasting damages on youth’s career.
Based on a very rich database combining survey with administrative data, we focus on a
representative sample of low educated school-leavers graduating in Flanders in the 1994–
2002 period and evaluate the impact of the early experience of non-employment on a
range of later labour market outcomes: hours worked and earnings for salaried public and
private sector employment as well as indicators of salaried and self-employment. This
gives us a comprehensive view of the long-term consequences of the early experience of
non-employment for low skilled workers.
The main identification problem is the presence of unobserved individual character-
istics that may affect labour market performance as well as the (selective) incidence of
early non-employment. This introduces an endogeneity problem in that the relationship
between the early experience of non-employment and later labour market outcomes may
be driven by individual unobservables rather than causality. We address this problem
by means of an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, where the provincial unemploy-
ment rate at graduation is used as instrument for early non-employment. The intuition
is that the variation in the local unemployment rate at graduation is exogenous to the
individual and therefore generates a variation in the early experience of non-employment
that is unrelated to the unobserved factors that may influence both early and adult
performances.
Thus, the IV strategy relies on the exogenous variation of the provincial unemployment
rate at graduation to identify the long-term effects of early non-employment. Since the
estimation includes province fixed effects, the identification exploits the time variation
of the provincial unemployment rate series in the 1994–2002 period. Note, by includ-
ing province fixed effects, we account for spacial sorting, that is, the possibility that
individuals sort into provinces according to unobservable characteristics. Since the unem-
ployment rate varies across 9 graduation years and 5 Flemish provinces, inference hinges
at most on 45 clusters. This raises the possibility of underestimating standard errors due
to few clusters. We tackle this problem by applying wild bootstrap methods to the IV
approach, following Davidson and MacKinnon (2010).
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature and
points out the contribution of this paper. The data are described in Section 3. In Section 4
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we explain the estimation strategy: we discuss the IV approach, including the way in which
we deal with the problem of inference with few clusters. Section 5 illustrates the results
and presents some sensitivity analyses. Section 6 discusses the policy implications and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it pertains to the literature on
the long-term impact of youth unemployment. This literature is quite rich and overall
suggests that the consequences of experiencing youth unemployment are not just tem-
porary. However, these studies tend to explore this effect each time on a single outcome.
According to a number of them, the early experience of unemployment leads to subse-
quent unemployment (Gregg 2001 for UK, Schmillen and Umkehrer 2013 for Germany,
Cockx and Picchio 2013 for Belgium). In addition, being unemployed when young is
found to inflict persistent penalties on earnings (Gartell 2009 for Sweden, Gregory and
Jukes 2001 for UK) and wages (Gregg and Tominey 2005 for UK, Mroz and Savage 2006
for US). Our research contributes to this literature by considering a range of labour mar-
ket outcomes, thereby providing a comprehensive view of the long-term consequences of
the early experience of non-employment on workers’ careers.
Two studies have already investigated the long-term impact of unemployment for
Belgium. On the one hand, Gangji and Plasman (2007) study the adverse effect of expe-
riencing unemployment on re-entry wages based on a representative sample of Belgian
workers aged 18–64 in the 1994–2002 period.2 They find that the incidence of unem-
ployment reduces hourly wages by 5.1%. Of course, this is an average of heterogenous
effects, while unemployment is likely to have different consequences for young than for
mature workers (Kletzer and Fairlie 2003). On the other hand, Cockx and Picchio (2013)
investigate the long-run effects of youth long-term unemployment considering all Belgian
school-graduates aged 18–25 who in 1998 were unemployed for at least 9 months. They
find evidence of strong negative duration dependence in the job finding probability for
this specific sub-sample. Relative to both studies, we provide new evidence on a represen-
tative sample of Flemish youth, i.e. less restrictive than long-term unemployed youth (as
in the latter research) but more specific than the overall working-age population (as in the
former one). Even if not directly comparable, our results are consistent with this evidence.
Moreover, this research is also related to a number studies that use the same IV
approach to address the long-term effects of youth unemployment for different coun-
tries.3 For the UK, Gregg (2001) and Gregg and Tominey (2005) use the local unem-
ployment rate at age 16 as instrument for the unemployment experience between ages
16–23 and find that the latter generates long-lasting effects on later employment and
wages, respectively. Similarly, for Germany, Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) show that
the unemployment experience in the first 8 years after graduation entails significant
scars on the unemployment experience in the subsequent 16 years, instrumenting the
former with the local unemployment rate at graduation. In a nutshell, all these studies
exploit the exogenous variation of the local unemployment rate to disentangle the causal-
ity between the early experience of unemployment and later labour market performance
from the spurious correlation induced by unobserved individual characteristics. In par-
ticular, the identification relies on the assumption that the early labour market conditions
affect workers’ career uniquely through the early experience of unemployment (exclusion
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restriction). As such, this is a strong assumption since it rules out the possibility that
the aforementioned relationship occurs through other channels, i.e. the acceptance of
lower-paying jobs early in the career.
Finally, our study is related to another strand of literature that focuses on the scar-
ring effect of graduating in recessions on youth’s careers. This literature is relevant to the
extent that it sheds some light on the credibility of the aforementioned exclusion restric-
tion, i.e. ultimately with respect to methodology. In fact, this research directly regresses
the unemployment rate at graduation on later labour market outcomes to identify the
adverse effect of graduating with high unemployment rates on different outcomes as well
as its persistence over the labour market career. Thus, these results are relevant to our
methodology because they provide intuitions about the underlying channels that drive
such a scar. The intuition is that, if one uses the unemployment rate at graduation as
an instrument for the early experience of non-employment in order to unveil the causal-
ity between the latter and later labour market performance, one relies on the exclusion
restriction that early unemployment is the underlying channel that explains the long-
term effects of graduating with high unemployment rates. Hence, evidence on which
channel accounts for the scars of graduating in recessions may support or invalidate the
exclusion restriction of our IV approach. The existing evidence broadly shows that the
labour market conditions at graduation have a persistent impact on the labour market
career of young graduates (e.g. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) for Canada, Kahn (2010) for US,
Brunner and Kuhn (2014) for Austria). Among this literature, Cockx and Ghirelli (2015)
offer a particularly relevant contribution by investigating the scarring effect of gradu-
ating in downturns for Flanders based on our data. Therefore, we use their results in
order to improve the credibility of our exclusion restriction relative to the aforemen-
tioned literature that applies the same IV approach to study the long-term effects of youth
unemployment for different countries.
Since our study builds upon the research of Cockx and Ghirelli (2015), we dedicate
to this study the rest of the section. Overall, the authors show that graduating during
downturns inflicts persistent penalties for both low and high educated Flemish youth but
that this scar occurs though different channels depending on the educational level. This
is because Belgian labour market institutions differ for white and blue collar workers,
and this creates different sources of rigidities for these two groups. White collar workers
are sheltered by a very strict employment protection legislation (EPL), which represents
the main source of rigidity for these workers. By contrast, blue collar workers have quite
loose EPL4 but are supported by short-term work compensation (STC) that subsidises
a temporary reduction of labour force during downturns. This introduces rigidity in the
labour market as it strongly restrains blue collar workers’ mobility, thereby having similar
consequences as EPL for white collar workers. In addition, the sectoral minimum wages
are among the highest in the OECD. Thus, minimum wages and STC are more relevant
sources of rigidity for low skilled workers.
Since the Belgian institutional setting generates different sources of rigidities for the
white and blue collar workers, one would like to study these groups separately, but the
choice between these workers’ categories is clearly endogenously related to the labour
market conditions and hence may induce selectivity. Thus, Cockx and Ghirelli (2015)
distinguish between “low educated” (with at least secondary education) and “high edu-
cated” (with higher education) new graduates by exploiting two features of the data. First,
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there is a clear correspondence between low educated and blue collar workers as well as
between high educated and white collar workers: within the first 6 years after graduation,
70% of low educated are prevalently employed as blue collar workers, while this figure
corresponds only to 14% for the high educated (see Table 3 in Appendix A). Second, the
moment of graduation—and hence the educational attainment—is found to be unrelated
to the business cycle.5 In our study, we will rely on these arguments to select the low
educated.
According to this research, graduating in downturns inflicts a scar on earnings for
both the low and the high educated Flemish youth, but the low educated are penalised
in terms of annual hours worked and not wages, while the reverse occurs for the high
educated. Thus, due to unfavourable labour market conditions at graduation, the high
educated downgrade to lower-paying jobs, whereas the low educated remain unemployed
more often.6 This means that, in Flanders, the aforementioned scar on earnings occurs
through different channels depending on the educational level, i.e. (i) the loss of early
work experience for the low educated and (ii) the acceptance of lower-paying jobs for
high educated (ii). Evidence (i) runs in favour of the identifying assumption required to
study the long-term penalties of early non-employment by means of our IV approach.
Since this evidence applies only to the low educated, we focus on the this group of
workers.
3 Data
The analysis is based on the Sonar survey database, a representative sample of three birth-
cohorts of Flemish youth—born in 1976, 1978 or 1980—which were interviewed at age 23,
26 and 29.7 The surveys register retrospectively and on a monthly basis the most impor-
tant activity of the respondents, among which education. Based on this information,
graduation is identified to occur in the first month that education has been interrupted
for more than 4 months. The surveys also contain control variables for the analysis, mea-
sured before the end of compulsory education (set at age 18 in Belgium) such that they
are predetermined with respect to graduation: father’s and mother’s education, the type
of educational programme in which the individual is enroled at age 17, and the number of
repeated grades at age 17 since secondary education.8 In addition, we calculate for each
individual the number of grades successfully passed from the start of secondary educa-
tion until graduation. Accordingly, we divide the sample between low and high educated,
with the former having completed at most secondary education and the latter having a
higher level of education.9 In doing this we follow Cockx and Ghirelli (2015) since the
Belgian institutional setting entails different sources of rigidities for blue and white collar
workers and because there is a clear correspondence between the educational level and
the worker’s function (see Section 2).
The original Sonar sample contains about 9,000 individuals, 3,000 for each birth cohort.
We restrict it as follows. We exclude the few observations who dropped out from school-
ing before the end of compulsory education. We focus on men since female labour supply
is different from male labour supply due to mothering.10 To increase the homogeneity of
the sample, we drop individuals who attended special needs and arts education, who were
not Belgian or did not speak Flemish at home, or who did not reside in Flanders at grad-
uation. We retain individuals graduating from age 18 and 24, as students graduating after
24 years old are less than 5% of the sample. After eliminating individuals with missing or
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inconsistent values in variables, we are left with a final sample of 3,586 low and high edu-
cated male youth. From this, we focus on 1,902 low educated youth who graduated in the
period 1994–2002. Descriptive statistics of the final sample are in Appendix A.
The survey data are matched to administrative data of Belgian Social Insurance insti-
tutions centralised at the Cross Roads Bank of Social Security, which give us access to
high quality information on workers’ labour market history. These data report quarterly
information on the registration as self-employed as well as earnings and time worked
in dependent employment (for both public and private sector) between 1998 and 2010.
We construct three employment indicators: salaried employment, defined by positive
earnings from salaried employment; self-employment, based on the registration as self-
employed for at least one day during the calendar year; overall employment, which is the
sum of self- and salaried employment.11 In addition, we construct a measure of annual
earnings and hours worked for dependent employment.
For all outcomes we rely on linearmodels because our empirical strategy is already com-
plicated by the IV approach combined with wild bootstrap methods. For binary outcomes
we use linear probability models since OLS provide a good approximation of the of the
average partial effects (APE) (Angrist and Pischke 2009, ch.3.4.2). As for hours worked,
this variable is censored at zero. In principle, OLS are not consistent, while Tobit models
are the appropriate estimationmethods. However, since the fraction of corner solutions is
quite small—only 15% of the sample—OLS still provide a good approximation of the APE
on hours worked.12 By contrast, earnings are truncated, i.e. missing if individuals are not
salaried employed. This may bias the results if salaried employed are a positively selec-
tive group. In principle, Heckman’s 1979’ selection model is the appropriate approach to
address selectivity. Yet results can be very poor in absence of exclusion restrictions, as
the equation of interest is only identified through the non-linearity of the Inverse Mills
ratio—the term capturing selectivity (Puhani 2000). Unfortunately, we do not have a valid
exclusion restriction for the selection equation.13 Ergo, results from the Heckman’s selec-
tion model should not be trusted. To avoid selectivity, we set earnings to zero in case
of non-employment, as if earnings were censored. This allows us to estimate uncondi-
tional effects and hence rule out the problem of selectivity due to restricting to salaried
employed. As for hours worked, we check that OLS provide a good approximation of
the APE of interest.14 Lastly, we transform the continuous outcomes in logs in order to
interpret the coefficients as semi-elasticities. Note, before taking the logarithmic transfor-
mation we add value one so that non-salaried employed are retained in the analysis with
zero log-earnings and zero log-hours worked.15 The outcomes are measured 6 years after
graduation. This is because we want to measure the outcomes as late as possible for all
graduation cohorts given the availability of the administrative data (1998–2010).16 Table
6 in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics of the outcome variables.
In addition, the administrative data provide additional controls measured at age 17: liv-
ing in single parent household, not living together with either parents and the number of
other household members by age class. Descriptive statistics of the controls are reported
in Table 5 of Appendix A.17 Finally, the administrative data give us access to yearly infor-
mation on the province of residence between the year in which the individual turns 17
and 2010.
From the year of graduation onwards, we associate each calendar year to a potential
year of labour market experience, which corresponds to zero in the year of graduation.18
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Potential experience zero lasts from the month subsequent to graduation until December
of that calendar year so that its length is computed as (12 − month_of _graduation). All
subsequent years of potential experience have a duration of 12 months. Our regressor of
interest is a measure of the time spent in non-employment at potential experience 0–2
relative to the potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period.
We express it as a proportion in order to take into account the fact that the reference
period changes depending on the month of graduation, thereby ensuring that early non-
employment is comparable across individuals. For a June graduate—which amounts to
90% of the sample—this period corresponds to two and a half years after graduation. For
simplicity, hereafter we will refer to this reference period as its average, i.e. two and a half
years after graduation.
This endogenous regressor can be measured precisely based on administrative data
on hours worked in salaried employment. Yet, the latter are available since 1998, while
graduation is observed since 1994. Thus, this variable is based on administrative data
for students graduating since 1998 (68.5% of the sample), while it is imputed using
Sonar data whenever potential experience 0–2 occurs before 1998 (31.5% of sample).
The reason why we combine administrative with survey data is to maximize the sample
and hence exploit the maximal instrument’s variation considering the entire graduation
period 1994–2002 instead of the restricted period 1998–2002. Of course, the disadvan-
tage is that the Sonar dataset contains less precise information on time worked: this
certainly introduces measurement error in the endogenous regressor. Briefly, the latter
is constructed as follows (for details, see Appendix B): first, sum up all hours worked
including self-employment in the first two and a half years after graduation (a);19 sec-
ond, compute the potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole
period (b); third, express early non-employment as 100 ∗ (b − a)/b. Given the possibility
of measurement error arising from the combination of survey and administrative data,
Section 5.1 performs a sensitivity analysis considering the restricted graduation period
1998–2002 where only administrative data are exploited to measure the endogenous
regressor.
Finally, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides us with the provincial unemployment
rate (15–64) for Flanders from year 1993 until 2011 (see Fig. 1), which we use as instru-
ment for early non-employment. Note, the literature typically exploits more disaggregated
unemployment rate series.20 For Belgium, provincial unemployment rates are the most
disaggregated data available for the period considered. The main drawback is that infer-
ence relies on too few clusters as the identification of the effects of interest comes from
the variation of the unemployment rates by provinces and years. Yet we tackle this prob-
lem with wild bootstrap methods. By contrast, a more aggregated series reduces the
problem of endogenous migration, which may arise if workers offset the scars of early
non-employment by moving or commuting in provinces where there are more jobs. Our
data suggest that in Flanders less than 2% of individuals change province of residence
in the 1998–2010 period. Yet, as Flanders is a relatively small region, people could com-
mute to work across provinces. In this case, we would underestimate long-term effects
of early non-employment.21 However, the magnitude of the inter-provincial variation in
the unemployment rate reported in Fig. 1 demonstrates that mobility is limited and far
from eliminates all inter-provincial variation. This is because LFS series are based on
the province of residence and not of job location: thus, if workers commute to avoid
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Fig. 1 Provincial unemployment rates (15–64) for Flanders: the graduation period for the low educated
ranges between 1994–2002. For details on the series, see Section S.1.5 of “Additional file 1”. Based on total
population (men & women). Source: Labour Force Survey
the adverse local labour market conditions, this evens out the provincial variation in the
unemployment rate.
4 Estimation strategy
We are interested in the causality between the early experience of non-employment (Y 0)
and later labour market outcomes (Y ) for the low educated. Namely, we want to estimate
an equation of the following type, where X is a vector of control variables that will be
defined below and  is an idiosyncratic error term:
Y = α + βY 0 + δX + e with e = θ +  (1)
The main identification problem is the presence of some unobserved factors θ that affect
both early non-employment and later labour market performance, thereby introducing
endogeneity. Thus, OLS estimates will be biased due to these omitted factors. We remove
this bias by means of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator in which the provincial
unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument (Z) for early non-employment.22
In practice, the identification strategy relies on the variation of the provincial unem-
ployment rate at graduation Z, which is exploited to generate an exogenous variation
in the early experience of non-employment, which is then used to identify causality. In
accordance with the traditional IV approach, we assume that the effect of interest is
homogeneous.23 In this framework, 2SLS identify the causal effect of interest under two
conditions:
1. Z is uncorrelated with e. This implies that Z does not directly affect the outcome Y
(exogeneity) and that any indirect effect of Z on Y occurs uniquely through the
endogenous regressor Y 0 (exclusion restriction). This is an identifying assumption.
2. Z is correlated with Y 0 conditional on controls X (strength). This can be tested by
means of the F statistic of the excluded instrument in the first stage regression.
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Note, in this framework, the IV estimator refers to the entire population since the causal
effect of interest is assumed to be homogeneous across individuals. The next section dis-
cusses in detail assumption 1. In particular, we will carefully examine which factors may
violate the exclusion restriction and define the specification in such a way that the latter
is most likely satisfied conditional on the covariates.
4.1 The instrumental variable approach: identifying assumptions
Together, Conditions 1 and 2 above require that the instrument explains the endogenous
regressor while being exogenous in Eq. (1). This has the following implications.
First, it amounts to rule out reverse causality between, Z and Y 0, that is the unem-
ployment rate at graduation affects early non-employment but not the other way around.
We exclude the possibility of reverse causality since the instrument and the endoge-
nous regressor are measured at the provincial and individual level, respectively, and an
aggregate variable cannot be caused by an individual variable.
Second, the exogeneity assumption in Condition 1 requires that the unemployment rate
Z does not affect the unobserved composition of new graduates by year and province.
If this were the case, the relation between the instrument and early non-employment
would spuriously reflect changes in the composition of graduates rather than causal-
ity, which would introduce selectivity. To rule this out, one has to assume that students
choose the moment of graduation independently of the business cycle (exogeneity of the
timing of graduation) and that before graduation they do not move to provinces where
the unemployment rate is lower relatively to others (exogeneity of place). We test the
former condition in Section S.5 of “Additional file 1” and demonstrate that the dura-
tion between the end of compulsory education and each year of potential graduation is
unrelated to the provincial unemployment rate in those years.24 As for mobility, almost
nobody (0.44%) changes residence between the year in which the individual turns 17 and
the year of graduation. Therefore, the issue can be safely ignored.25 On this basis, we
argue that in our sample the choice of graduation is independent from the labour market
conditions.
Third, the exclusion restriction in Condition 1 requires that the instrument is not cor-
related with any of the omitted factors in Eq. (1). This implies assuming that the scars
of graduating in downturns for the low educated are determined exclusively by early
non-employment. This assumption is consistent with the results of Cockx and Ghirelli
(2015), who find that, for the low educated, the unemployment rate at graduation entails
a persistent negative effect on hours worked and earnings but not on wages. This means
that the low educated who graduate in downturns experience longer periods of non-
employment at the start of the career, and this has repercussions in the long-term. The
absence of a negative impact on wages is due to the presence of high minimum wages,
which are likely to be binding for low educated youth. This suggests that, for the low
educated, accepting lower-paying jobs is not a relevant channel to explain the scarring
effects of graduating in downturns. Thus, based on the aforementioned evidence, we
argue that early non-employment is the relevant channel to explain such a scar for the low
educated.
Of course things can be a bit more blurry if we consider a wider definition of reser-
vation wage which also incorporates the future wage growth linked with seniority in
addition to the current wage. In this case, the low educated graduating in a downturn may
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not only experience higher early non-employment, but could also accept lower-quality
jobs, i.e. with a less steep wage profile than the jobs accessed during a tight labour mar-
ket. The unemployment rate at graduation would then entail a growing negative impact
on later wages as a consequence of accepting this initial job, and this would represent a
violation of the exclusion restriction when wages are the outcome of interest. Thus, we
do not consider later wages as an outcome variable. By contrast, we restrict the analy-
sis to hours worked and earnings, since the long-term penalties on the these outcomes
are compatible with the idea that early non-employment is the main driver of these
scars.
However, other channels may also contribute to explain the long-term penalties of
labour market conditions at graduation: these channels would invalidate the exclu-
sion restriction if not included in the specification. An example is the persistence
of the unemployment rate series. If the current unemployment rate affects the out-
comes, the correlation between the former and the unemployment rate at graduation
violates the assumption that the instrument affects the outcomes only through early
non-employment. To prevent that, it is important to additionally control for the current
unemployment rate. Yet, this may not be enough, as in principle one should control for all
unemployment rate series up to the moment of evaluation (Oreopoulos et al. 2012, 2008).
To keep a parsimonious specification, we add the average unemployment rate between
the end of the early period and the moment of evaluation—between potential experience
3 and 6.26
More generally, the problem of the persistence of the unemployment rate refers to the
literature on wage determination (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). According to this view,
labourmarkets operate as spot markets if current wages are affected by the current unem-
ployment rate and not by past ones. By contrast, wages result from long-term implicit
contracts if past unemployment rates explain current wages: in addition, with costless
mobility, the minimum unemployment rate since hiring should matter the most, as work-
ers are able to renegotiate the wage once better labour market conditions arise. In this
case, the exclusion restriction may be violated if the unemployment rate at graduation
mistakenly picks up the effect of the minimum unemployment rate since hiring because
of the persistence of the unemployment rates. To prevent that, we include the minimum
unemployment rate since graduation in the specification.27
Finally, other violations of the exclusion restriction may be due, for instance, to dif-
ferences in institutions that could be correlated both with the unemployment rate at
graduation and with the outcomes. We therefore include province fixed effects to ensure
that permanent differences across provinces do not violate the exclusion restriction.
Similarly, we include province-specific time trends to capture whatever time-varying
provincial heterogeneity, such as changes in legislations, that may be correlated with the
instrument and the outcomes. In the next section we present the equation of interest in
light of all these arguments.
4.2 The equation of interest
To avoid clutter, we state the following definitions: t is the observation period which runs
from graduation until the moment in which the outcomes are measured (T), i.e. 6 years
after graduation; t0 is the year in which students are aged 17, i.e. before the end of com-
pulsory education; t1 is the time window in which we measure early non-employment,
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on average the first two and a half years after graduation.28 We estimate the follow-
ing equation, where subscript i indicates the individual, g the graduation year and p the
province of residence at graduation:
yigpT = α + βy0it1 + γ1URpT + γ2URp + x′it0δ + ζminURpt + ηp + ωpT + f (g) + eigpT
with eigpT = θi + ipgT (2)
• yigpT represents the following outcomes: three indicators of salaried, self- and overall
employment, as well as log hours worked and log earnings for salaried employment.
• y0it1 is the endogenous regressor representing early non-employment: it is expressed
as the percentage of time spent in non-employment in period t1, relative to potential
total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period.
• URpT is the current unemployment rate in the province of residence at graduation. It
ensures that the exclusion restriction is not violated by the correlation between the
current labour market conditions and the labour market conditions at graduation.
• URp is the time average of the unemployment rate in the period subsequent to the
early period, i.e. from potential experience 3 to 6. Together with URpT , it controls for
the persistence of the unemployment rate series.
• minURpt is the minimum unemployment rate in the province of residence at
graduation over the entire period t. It controls for the possibility that wages are
determined by long-term contracts and renegotiated by the workers during upturns.
• xit0 is a set of individual control variables, predetermined since measured in t0: birth
cohort dummies, family composition, parental education, repeated years since
secondary education as well as the educational track at age 17.
• ηp are fixed effects for the province of living at graduation: they control for all
differences across provinces that are constant over time, e.g. differences in
institutions or in the structure of the economy. This also controls for spatial sorting.
• ωpT are province-specific linear time trends, included since the provincial
unemployment rates exhibit differential downward time trends (see Fig. 1). In
addition, this controls for any time-varying provincial heterogeneity.
• f (g) is a linear spline in the graduation year, which controls for aggregate shocks
affecting all provinces over the graduation period.29 The spline is formulated as
f (g) = α +∑2j=0 βj.(g − 3j)1[ g ≥ 3j] with g = 1, .., 9.
• igpT is an i.i.d. error term, while θi represents unobserved individual factors that are
correlated with y0it1 and hence introduce endogeneity.
β is the coefficient of interest representing the scarring effect of a one percentage point
(pp) increase in the proportion of time spent in early non-employment on the outcomes
(employment rates, hours worked and earnings) for the low educated: in presence of
scarring we expect a negative β . The OLS estimate of β is biased due to the correla-
tion between θi and y0it1. We remove this bias by instrumenting y
0
it1 with the provincial
unemployment rate at graduation in the IV approach.
Note, we cannot control for the labour market performance in the intermediate period
(i.e. between potential experience 3–5) because it is endogenous.30 Thus, β is an average
between the direct effect of the early experience of non-employment and its persistence
over time. The latter represents the extent to which the early labour market performance
is correlated with the labour market performance in the intermediate period, which in
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turn is correlated with the labour market performance at the moment of evaluation (e.g.
through state dependence). We believe that β still provides an interesting measure of
the scars of early non-employment although we are not able to further disentangle (i)
the direct effect of the early experience of non-employment from (ii) the effect of the
experience of non-employment in the intermediate period which is consequence of early
non-employment.31
For simplicity, we estimate (2) by OLS and 2SLS for all dependent variables. Thus, for
binary outcomes we use linear probability models. For continuous outcomes we report
unconditional effects ignoring that they are left-censored at zero. However, linear meth-
ods still provide a good approximation of the APE of interest on the censored outcomes
(see Section 3 and endnotes 12 and 14).
4.3 The bias and its direction
The aforementioned bias can go in both directions. The latter depends on the sign of the
relationship between the omitted factor and the outcome as well as on the sign of the
covariance between the omitted factor and early non-employment. Below we discuss four
possible sources of bias and their corresponding sign.
• Ability and motivation: everything else equal, higher ability and motivation are
associated with better performance in the labour market: thus these factors are
correlated negatively with early non-employment and positively with the outcomes.
The overall bias is negative so that OLS overestimate the (negative) scarring effect of
early non-employment.
• Returns to job search: ceteris paribus, individuals with higher returns to job search
are expected to search more and more successfully and hence perform better in the
labour market (positive correlation with the outcomes). At the same time, they may
engage in “job shopping” early in the career and alternate jobs with short spells in
non-employment if they find it optimal to consume leisure when young.32 This
generates a positive correlation between returns to search and early non-employment
(Neumark 2002). Accordingly, the bias is positive and OLS underestimate
scarring.
• Liquidity constraints: liquidity-constrained individuals have a low reservation wage
and hence are likely to accept the first job offer even though this means taking a
low-level job. Thus, we expect liquidity constraints to be negatively correlated with
early non-employment but also to translate into worse labour market performance
over time (i.e. negative correlation with the outcomes). The resulting bias is positive
so that OLS underestimate scarring.
• Measurement error: measurement error in the endogenous regressor reduces OLS
estimates towards zero (Hausman 2001), thereby underestimating the scarring effect
of early non-employment. We introduce measurement error in the construction of
early non-employment, as we use information from the Sonar database to impute
hours worked in the first two and a half years after graduation for students graduating
before 1998, which are not observed in the administrative data (see Section 3).
To recapitulate, we expect OLS to overestimate the scarring effect of early non-
employment on the outcomes if the bias comes from ability. By contrast, OLS will
underestimate this scar if the bias is due to returns to job search, measurement error
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in the endogenous regressor, or liquidity constraints. The literature is in favour of the
latter hypothesis (Gregg 2001; Gregg and Tominey 2005; Neumark 2002; Schmillen and
Umkehrer 2013).
4.4 Inference
It is well known that standard errors are underestimated in a micro-level regression with
grouped covariates because it is assumed that each observation is independent of all
others, while the independent information of the grouped covariates varies at the group
level. Thus, correct inference requires taking this into account by using cluster-robust
standard errors (Moulton 1990). In our 2SLS this is important because we use the provin-
cial unemployment rate at graduation, a grouped variable, as the instrument for early
non-employment, which varies at the individual level. Thus, the identification of causal-
ity comes from the aggregate variation of the unemployment rate at graduation, which is
exploited to construct the fitted values of the first stage (Angrist and Pischke 2009, ch.8).
The clustered estimator is consistent provided that the number of clusters is large
enough, as consistency is determined by the law of large numbers. Since we consider
the low educated graduating in 5 Flemish provinces in the 1994–2002 period, infer-
ence hinges on 44 clusters.33 This raises the possibility of underestimating standard
errors due to few clusters. Applying the clustered estimator when clusters are too few
is likely to worsen the bias, with cluster-robust standard errors being even smaller than
the conventional ones (MacKinnon and Webb 2015). This is what we find by compar-
ing heteroskedastic-robust and cluster-robust standard errors of 2SLS estimations (see
Table 1), which suggests that we have too few clusters.
We tackle this problem with wild restricted efficient residual bootstrap methods pro-
posed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010), which are designed for 2SLS in the context
of heteroskedasticity or clustered data. This procedure combines the restricted effi-
cient residual bootstrap designed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2008) for 2SLS with
the wild bootstrap of Cameron et al. (2008) that allows for intra-cluster correlation and
heteroskedasticity. For completeness, we apply wild bootstraps to the t statistic of the
instrument in the first stage as well as to the t statistic of the regressor of interest when
estimating Eq. (2) by OLS.34
Because of few clusters, the F statistic of the first stage is also overestimated. To adjust
it, we exploit the fact that in case of one instrument the F statistic is the square of the t
statistic of the instrument in the first stage: i.e., with G clusters, F(1,G − 1) = t2(G − 1).
Therefore, the bootstrap F statistic is the critical value of the F(1,G − 1) distribution
that corresponds to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument in the first
stage.35
5 Results
Table 1 summarizes the main results for alternative labour market outcomes. As a mat-
ter of space, we report only the effect of early non-employment estimated by OLS
and 2SLS, i.e. β in the structural equation as well as the impact of the instrument in
the first stage regression. The complete regressions are reported in Appendix C. Odds
and even columns show heteroskedastic-robust36 and cluster-robust standard errors,
respectively. In principle, the latter are more conservative since they allow for the
intra-cluster correlation induced by the fact that the instrument is a grouped variable.
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Table 1 Effect of interest on outcomes measured 6 years after graduation
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
Standard errorsa Robust Cluster g ∗ p Robust Cluster g ∗ p
Outcomes: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Salaried empl. coeff –0.00169*** –0.00169*** –0.00256 –0.00256
se (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00375) (0.00290)
P-val 0.00019 0.38202
Bootstrap P-valb 0 0.45646
Exogeneity test P-valc 0.767
Self-empl. coeff 0.00054* 0.00054 0.00248 0.00248
se (0.00030) (0.00041) (0.00338) (0.00258)
P-val 0.19177 0.34175
Bootstrap P-val 0.18619 0.37437
Exogeneity test P-val 0.438
Overall empl. coeff –0.00115*** –0.00115*** –0.00008 –0.00008
se (0.00021) (0.00025) (0.00207) (0.00151)
P-val 0.00005 0.95655
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.96697
Exogeneity test P-val 0.467
Log earnings coeff –0.0269*** –0.0269*** –0.1002** –0.1002***
se (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0419) (0.0291)
P-val 2.51E-08 0.0013
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0060
Exogeneity test P-val 0.00970
Log hours worked coeff –0.0203*** –0.0203*** –0.0723** –0.0723***
se (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0307) (0.0207)
P-val 9.35E-09 0.0011
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.0060
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0112
Panel B: Effect of the instrument in the first stage : OLS
Outcome: Standard errors: Robust Cluster g ∗ p
Early non-empl. coeff 5.4615*** 5.4615***
se (1.7273) (1.6848)
P-val 0.00230
Bootstrap P-val 0.00400
F stat 10.51
Bootstrap F statd 9.25
Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in Eq. (2). β is the effect of one pp increase in y0it1,
i.e. the % of hours spent in non-employment in the first two and a half years after graduation relative to potential total hours if
one would work full-time during the whole period. For clustered standard errors, we report the
P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1-2 (3-4) showOLS (2SLS). In 2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation
is used as instrument for y0it1. Panel B shows the effect of the instrument on y
0
it1
in the first stage and the corresponding F statistic
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aRobust accounts for heteroskedasticity. Clusters are defined by graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p
(G = 44 clusters)
bComputed according to the wild bootstrap proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010) for 999 repetitions
cWith clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation
where y0it1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
it1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0it1 is
exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ2(1)
dBootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: for G = 44, t2(G − 1) = F(1,G − 1)
However, the fact that the 2SLS cluster-robust standard errors are smaller than the 2SLS
heteroskedastic-robust ones (columns 3 and 4 in Panel A) suggests that clustering is inef-
fective because of too few clusters. We ensure that correct inference is being made by
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bootstrapping the t statistic of the effect of interest and by reporting the corresponding
P-value.
Panel B summarises the results of the first stage regression. We report the original F
statistic (10.51) as well as the bootstrap one (9.25), which accounts for the problem of few
clusters. As expected, the former is overestimated. According to the Stock-Yogo critical
values, this statistic indicates that the IV estimator of β over-rejects the null, as it leads to
a rejection rate close to 15% when the true rejection rate is 5% (Stock and Yogo 2005).37
Thus, due to this test size, IV estimates should be taken with caution.
The upper part of Panel A refers to the employment indicators. The sign of the estimates
suggests that early non-employment has a positive impact on the probability to be self-
employed and a negative impact on the probability to be salaried employed, but the size of
both effects is very small. In contrast to OLS, 2SLS are not significant: this may be because
of the too small power of the test due to the limited strength of the instrument. The null
hypothesis of the exogeneity test is largely not rejected for all indicators,38 suggesting
that both estimators are consistent but OLS is more efficient than 2SLS. We therefore
focus on the former: for one pp increase in early non-employment, the probability to be
salaried employed and overall employed decrease by 0.17% and 0.12%, respectively. These
effects are statistically significant. Self-employment increases by 0.05%, but the impact is
statistically insignificant.
More significant effects are shown in the bottom part of Panel A, which reports the
unconditional effect of interest on continuous outcomes. The null of the exogeneity test
is rejected in all cases, meaning that the 2SLS estimator is consistent as opposed to the
OLS. A comparison between the estimates suggests that OLS underestimate the scar-
ring effect of early non-employment. This is in line with the hypothesis that the bias is
caused by returns to search, liquidity constraints or measurement error in the endoge-
nous regressor, and consistent with what found in the literature. The 2SLS results indicate
that one pp increase in early non-employment reduces earnings and hours worked by
10% and 7%, respectively (column 4). Both estimates are highly significant (at 1% level).
Yet, the P-values of column 4 may be underestimated due to few clusters. We tackle
this by computing the bootstrap P-value for the t statistic of β . The latter is higher than
the P-value of clustered standard errors, but still lower than 0.05. Thus, the impact of
early non-employment on continuous outcomes remains significant even allowing for few
clusters.
These estimates suggest that the low educated who experience early non-employment
at the start of the career are still significantly penalised in terms of hours worked and
earnings 6 years after graduation. The results on hours worked are not directly compa-
rable but consistent with the existing literature, which reports persistent effects of early
unemployment on later unemployment. However, our results are somewhat larger. For
British low educated youth, Gregg (2001) finds that a 3-months increase in the unemploy-
ment duration before age 23 significantly increases the time out of work between age 28
and 33 by 2 months. Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013) obtain larger effects based on new
graduates from the German apprenticeship programme: one additional day of unemploy-
ment during the first 8 years after graduation increases unemployment in the following
16 years by 0.96 days—almost a one to one change. The larger scar estimated for Belgium
may be explained by the Belgian institutional setting, which leads to high labour market
rigidities, as argued in Section 2.
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Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix C show the entire OLS and 2SLS regressions for continuous
and binary outcomes, respectively. The individual controls show the expected signs: in
the first stage regression, grade repetition in secondary education is positively associated
with early non-employment, while technical, vocational and apprenticeship programmes
are associated with a lower proportion of time spent in early non-employment com-
pared to general education (column 5 of Table 7). This suggests that these programmes
improve school-to-work transition relative to general education. Note that mother’s edu-
cation is positively associated with early non-employment in the first stage and with the
probability to be self-employed in the OLS regression, but it is negatively associated with
the outcomes related to salaried employment: we do not have a clear explanation for this
finding.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
As a first sensitivity analysis, we want to rule out that the results of Table 1 are driven
by multicollinearity, which may arise because in Eq. (2) we include a number of controls
for the persistence of the unemployment rate: the current unemployment rate (URpT ),
the average unemployment rate since the end of the early period and the moment of
evaluation (URp), and the minimum unemployment rate since graduation (minURpt). To
check this, we rerun the model by including only the current unemployment rate (thereby
excluding URp and minURpt): the results of this restricted specification are reported in
Table 9 of Appendix D. The stability of the results ensures that multicollinearity is not
driving the results.
As a second sensitivity analysis, we assess the impact of measurement error in the
endogenous regressor, which arises from the combination of survey and administrative
data. In fact, early non-employment is measured precisely for individuals graduating in
the 1998–2002 period based on administrative data, but it is imputed for those graduating
in the 1994–1997 period based on the Sonar database (see Appendix B for details). This
allows us to maximize the variation of the instrument considering the entire graduation
period 1994–2002 at the cost of introducing some measurement error in the endogenous
regressor. To check to what extent measurement error affects the results, we rerun the
analysis by restricting the sample to graduation period 1998–2002 so that the endogenous
regressor is measured uniquely by administrative data. Of course, clusters are drastically
reduced from 44 to 24.39 This is problematic not only because it exacerbates the problem
of few clusters, but also because Eq. (2) contains too many parameters (k = 30) com-
pared to the number of clusters, and as a consequence the rank condition in 2SLS is not
satisfied.40 Thus, we need to reduce the parameters in Eq. (2).
We decide to exclude some of the non-significant individual controls and to keep in the
specification all the aggregate regressors, which are important to ensure the validity of the
exclusion restriction.41 In particular, we drop the following controls that are jointly not
significant at the 5% level according to an F test in the first stage regression: dummy for
living with single parent, dummy for not living with parents, number of household mem-
bers aged 12–17, 18–29, 30–64, 65+ (we keep the number of household members aged
0–11 since it is significant); plus, we aggregate all educational tracks different from gen-
eral education (technical, vocational, part-time education or apprenticeship) and include
a dummy for general education instead.42 Table 11 shows that results are robust to this
alternative specification, as the OLS estimate of the endogenous regressor is very stable
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in the full specification (column 1 and 4) and in the restricted specification (column 2
and 5), provided that both specifications are based on the graduation period 1994–2002.
Panel B of Table 10 reports the first stage regression for the 1998–2002 period. This
table should be compared to Table 1. First, the bootstrap F statistic is 3.6 for the grad-
uation period 1998–2002 compared to 9.2 for the period 1994–2002, therefore, the
instrument becomes weak by restricting to the former period. As expected, the increased
discrepancy between the original F and the bootstrap F statistic in Table 10 compared to
Table 1 shows that the few-clusters bias worsens significantly when shifting from 44 to
24 clusters. Second, the direct effect of the instrument on early non-employment for the
1998–2002 period doubles compared to the period 1994–2002. This is because the for-
mer period focuses on the dot-com recession, whose effects are mitigated when a larger
span is considered. Given the low F statistic, 2SLS are not reliable.
However, we can focus on the OLS results in Table 11 to shed some light on the impor-
tance of measurement error in the endogenous regressor. In principle, this should bias
the OLS estimates for the 1994–2002 period (Column 1 and 4) towards zero. Yet, the OLS
estimates for the 1998–2002 period (Column 3 and 6) should not at all be affected by
measurement error since the endogenous regressor is entirely measured by administra-
tive data. Thus, we compare the first row across columns (column 1 with 3 and column 4
with 6): for both outcomes, the estimates are close, but the one based on the 1994–2002
period is slightly smaller than the corresponding estimate for the 1998–2002 period. This
is consistent with the presence of measurement error in the endogenous regressor. How-
ever, this difference is small (0.2 pp); thus, we conclude that measurement error in early
non-employment is not a major issue in the analysis.
6 Policy implications
According to our results, the early experience of non-employment entails important
penalties on the labour market career of low educated youth. These scars may be orig-
inated by the human capital depreciation occurring in the unemployment spell, by the
foregone human capital that would have been accumulated in case of early work experi-
ence, or because the early experience of non-employment is interpreted as a signal of low
quality. Even though this study does not allow to discern the actual source of the scar, it
makes clear that some policy interventions are needed.
At a micro level, one can think of specific curative policies to reduce the impact of
early non-employment depending on the channel through which the scar materialises.
If human capital depreciation is the main source of the scar, training schemes targeting
young unemployed would be an appropriate cure. If instead the main cause of the scar
is the loss of early work experience, policies that foster the integration of youth into the
labour market should be advocated, such as wage subsidy programmes. However, if the
cause is rather the bad signals conveyed by the unemployment status, it is likely that enter-
ing in subsidised programs would not improve how the young unemployed are perceived
by the employers.
In addition, an efficient way to tackle the aforementioned scars is to prevent the expe-
rience of unemployment in the first place. Therefore, policy interventions at an aggregate
level should strive to reach a successful macroeconomic framework with high sustained
levels of employment. The latter can be achieved by a flexicurity system, where a flexi-
ble labour market is associated with a generous insurance system that provides for the
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unemployed. On the one hand, flexibility should be enhanced to encourage employers
to take entrepreneurial risks and create more jobs. This is because labour market rigidi-
ties hamper productivity growth if they prevent worker reallocation or new hirings due
to high expected firing costs in future downswings. On the other hand, a generous UI
system should compensate workers for bearing a higher risk of unemployment due to
the increased flexibility in the labour market. Thus, in the context of flexicurity, low hir-
ing costs should enhance workers reallocation and new hirings as well as decrease the
expected duration of unemployment, thereby fostering early work experience. Yet, less
employable individuals may be long-term unemployed. This group should be supported
by active labour market programmes as well as training schemes to improve their labour
market prospects.
Belgian low educated workers face a number of rigidities which restrain worker’ reallo-
cation or new hirings. A first example is the STC programme, which anchors blue collar
employees to their employers in recessions and hence increases the expected future costs
of new hirings. A second rigidity is represented by high minimum wages, which limit the
absorption of low educated youth for whom minimum wages are binding. A third one is
the asymmetry between the flexible EPL for blue collars and a rigid EPL for white collars,
which characterised the Belgian labour market until 2013. Note that this controversial
discrimination has been removed since the beginning of 2014 as a single employment
contract has been introduced, stipulating the same EPL for white and blue collar workers.
Although this study concerns the cohorts that graduated in the period 1994–2002, the
policy lessons drawn in this section could be extended to neighboring periods in which
similar variations in the provincial unemployment rates occurred. In the 1994–2002
period, a typical downturn entailed an average increase in the provincial unemployment
rate of 1.4 pp.43 This variation is similar to the one that occurred in the Great Recession in
2008 when the provincial unemployment rates rose on average by 1.6 pp. Thus, we expect
that the negative consequences of early non-employment for the cohorts that graduated
during the Great Recession could be even larger than those found in this study. Therefore,
the aforementioned policy recommendations should also apply to the Great Recession
period.k
7 Conclusions
This study investigates the causal impact of the early experience of non-employment on
later labour market outcomes for a sample of low educated youth graduating in the 1994–
2002 period in Flanders, the most prosperous of the three Belgian regions. Our research
question is complicated by the fact that the early experience of non-employment is corre-
lated with unobserved individual factors which also affect later labour market outcomes.
This makes our regressor of interest endogenous due to an omitted variable problem.
The case of Belgium is particularly interesting because it is characterised by one of the
most rigid labour markets in the OECD. In addition, Belgian labour market institutions
entail different sources of rigidities for blue and white collar workers. Cockx and Ghirelli
(2015) provide evidence that, because of these differences, the scar of graduating in down-
turns occurs through the loss of early work experience for the low educated and through
the acceptance of lower-paying jobs for the high educated.
In this study, we define the empirical strategy in light of these results. We focus on the
low educated and address the endogeneity problem by means of an IV approach in which
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the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as an instrument for the early
experience of non-employment. The evidence provided by Cockx and Ghirelli (2015)
ensures that the exclusion restriction is most likely satisfied since the scar of graduating
in downturns is found to occur through the loss of early work experience for the low edu-
cated. Throughout the article we discuss the assumptions required by the IV estimator,
their validity and the role they play in the identification of causality between the early
experience of non-employment and later labour market outcomes. The problem of few
clusters is addressed by wild bootstrap methods.
We find that a one pp increase in the time spent in non-employment in the first two and
a half years since graduation decreases earnings from salaried employment 6 years after
graduation by 10% and annual hours worked by 7%. These effects are unconditional on
being salaried employed. To counteract these scars, any policy that prevents unemploy-
ment in the first place will be beneficial. At the aggregate level, policy interventions should
aim for a successful macroeconomic framework with sustained high levels of employ-
ment. The latter can be facilitated by the introduction of a flexicurity system. To the extent
that this strategy is not fully successful, specific curative policies at the micro level will be
required, such as training schemes or wage subsidies to target unemployed youth.
Endnotes
1Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) construct a composite index to rank the OECD countries
according to their labour market rigidity: Belgium is at the top of this ranking.
2For UK Arulampalam (2001) finds similar results for workers aged 18–64 in 1991–1997.
3Neumark (2002) identifies the causality of early job stability on adult wages with IV by
instrumenting indicators of early job stability with early labour market conditions.
4Note that since the beginning of 2014 a single employment contract has been introduced in
Belgium, stipulating the same EPL for white and blue collar workers.
5This evidence is relegated to Section S.5 of “Additional file 1”.
6The high educated downgrade due to strict EPL for white collars. The low educated
experience higher unemployment because of the higher competition for lower-paying jobs.
Their wages are not affected as minimum wages are likely to be binding for low educated youth.
7For more details, see Sonar (2003, 2004a, b).
8Parental education is defined as years of completed education since age 12. The type of
educational programme in which the individual is enrolled at age 17 can be general, technical,
vocational, part-time vocational or apprenticeship.
9The low educated have at most 6 years of completed education (7 years if enroled in
vocational track at age 17).The high educated have higher years of completed education.
10For women this research question is equally interesting and left for future research.
11Salaried employed who are also registered as self-employed in the same calendar year are
considered self-employed since the latter are few relative to salaried employed: at potential
experience 6.84% are only salaried employed, 7% are only self-employed and 5% are both
salaried and self-employed.
12To get some sense of it, we estimated Eq. (2) by OLS and Tobit on hours worked and
checked that the corresponding APE of interest are very similar: the OLS coefficient is −0.0203
and the APE after Tobit is −0.0231. Full results available upon request.
13Following Puhani (2000), we test for the presence of multicollinearity by looking at the R2
after regressing the covariates on the Inverse Mills Ratio: R2 = 0.95 suggests very high
multicollinearity. Exercise available upon request.
14We estimated Eq. (2) by OLS and Tobit on earnings: the OLS coefficient is −0.0269 and the
APE after Tobit is −0.0307. Full results available upon request.
15In a log-level regression, the coefficient of X on log(Y ) is interpreted as the % change of Y
for a unit increase in X (semi-elasticity). In our case, the coefficient of interest is only
“approximatively” a semi-elasticity, given that the dependent is log(Y + 1). Yet we verified that
this interpretation is a good approximation (exercise available upon request).
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16Results are similar when the outcomes are measured at potential experience 8, albeit the
instrument is weaker due to the smaller sample: exercise available upon request.
17For details on control and outcome variables see Section S.1 of “Additional file 1”.
18“Potential” underlines that the variable counts all calendar years since graduation as
opposed to actual experience, which endogenously considers only years of employment.
19For self-employed we assume the working regime of full-time salaried employed.
20At the district level (Schmillen and Umkehrer 2013) and at the ward level (Gregg 2001;
Gregg and Tominey 2005).
21If anything, this should be more worrying for the high educated as they are (i) less liquidity
constrained due to high expected wages or better working conditions and (ii) more mobile due
to high motivation to find jobs that meet their expectations.
22A similar approach has been used by Neumark (2002), Schmillen and Umkehrer (2013),
Gregg (2001) and Gregg and Tominey (2005).
23This assumption is restrictive. Under heterogeneous effects, the IV estimator identifies a
weighted average of local average treatment effects (LATE). Yet this requires additional
hypotheses, Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption and Monotonicity, which are very difficult
to hold in our case as they rule out crowding-out effects in the labour market.
24In a discrete duration model, an indicator of graduating since age 17 is regressed on birth
cohort dummies, individual controls and the province of living at age 17, the elapsed duration in
education since age 17, and the unemployment rate in each potential year of graduation
(interacted with the elapsed duration), testing if the coefficients of latter interactions are jointly
significantly different from zero. The test deals with selectivity induced by unobserved
heterogeneity. It uses the same sample as this study. For details, see Section S.5 of “Additional
file 1”.
25Students may endogenously commute to attend universities in provinces where they expect
to find jobs after graduation. Yet, this is not an issue, as the instrument is measured in the
province of residence at graduation and not in which they attend university.
26We run a sensitivity analysis only including current unemployment rate (see Table 9 in
Appendix D). The stability of the results rules out multicollinearity.
27The hypothesis of long-run implicit contracts is more likely for the high educated to capture
returns in human capital accumulation. Yet, low-skilled labour markets are shown to operate
like spot markets (Devereux and Hart 2007; Kilponen and Santavirta 2010).
28This time window corresponds to potential experience 0–2, i.e. from the month after
graduation until December of the second subsequent calendar year.
29We impose a piece-wise linear specification because graduation year fixed effects absorb too
much variation and as a consequence the instrument becomes weaker in the first stage.
30Gregg and Tominey (2005) face the same problem and adopt the same solution. They study
the causality between the unemployment experience at ages 16–23 and wages at age 33,
instrumenting the former with the local unemployment rate at age 16. In the IV estimation they
do not control for the unemployment experience at ages 23–33 (see Table 5) since their
empirical strategy does not allow to deal with both endogeneity problems. They control for it
only in the OLS (see Table 3) where the endogeneity is not addressed.
31I thank the anonymous referee for raising this point.
32Neumark (2002) justifies this hypothesis by arguing that, in a standard life cycle
utility-maximization model, individuals are more likely to consume leisure at the point in the life
cycle when their wages are low.
33Cluster g2002p3 is empty. Table 4 in Appendix A shows the distribution across clusters.
34In the first stage the instrument is grouped so we need to cluster. Yet, clustering is not a
major issue in the OLS estimation since the endogenous regressor varies at the individual level.
For completeness we provide heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust standard errors.
35We are aware of only one study (Baltagi et al. 2013) on the performance of wild bootstrap
applied to the F statistic in context of heteroskedastic (but not clustered) data. Bootstrapping
the F test directly in our wild bootstrap procedure does not always yield the expected results
(sometimes the bootstrap P-value of the F statistic is smaller than the P-value of the original F).
Thus, we rely on the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument in the first stage.
36When the dependent variable is binary or censored, the conditional variance (Var(y|x)) is
unlikely to be constant, i.e. errors are heteroskedastic.
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37With one instrument, the critical value for maximal size test of 10% and 15% is 16.3 and
8.96, respectively.
38This is not corrected for the few clusters problem. Thus, the P-value may be too small.
39In principle, 5 years times 5 provinces, i.e. G = 25. Yet, g2002p3 is empty.
40The Variance-Covariance matrix of the moment conditions has size (30 × 30) and rank
equal to 24 (Baum et al. 2003).
41Compared to aggregate controls, individual controls play a minor role since they alleviate
the problem of omitted individual variables, which is anyway tackled by IV.
42Reference is a category for technical, vocational, part-time education, and apprenticeship.
43This period encompasses the dot-com recession, which occurred in Belgium between
March 2001 and November 2001. This showed up in the provincial unemployment rates that in
Flanders rose between 2001–2003 and did not fall before 2005 (see Fig. 1).
Appendix
A Description of the final sample
In this study we consider almost the same sample as in Cockx and Ghirelli (2015). They
consider 1,885 low educated youth, while we consider 1,902 individuals: i.e. we add 17 low
educated individuals who graduated in 2002. Table 2 shows the distribution of attained
education for the final sample before dropping the high educated (for the low and the high
educated together): attained education is measured as the number of grades successfully
completed since the start of secondary education. In the analysis we focus only on the low
educated youth. For details in the construction of the control and outcome variables, see
Section S.1, S.2 and S.3 of “Additional file 1”.
B Construction of the endogenous regressor
Wedefine potential experience as a variable counting each calendar year since graduation.
Potential experience zero corresponds to the year of graduation and runs from the month
after graduation until December of that calendar year; therefore, it potentially lasts less
Table 2 Dividing the sample between the low and the high educated
Completed education Low educated High educated Total
1 2 2
2 36 36
3 89 89
4 113 113
5 185 185
6 1,111 1,111
7 366 289 655
8 55 55
9 707 707
10 367 367
11 232 232
12 33 33
13 1 1
Total 1,902 1,684 3,586
“Completed education” refers to the number of years of education successfully attained from the beginning of secondary
education, i.e. since age 12. The low educated attained at most secondary education, which consists in 7 years of education in
case of vocational track and 6 years for all other educational programmes. The high educated attained a higher education than
secondary education, since they successfully passed strictly more than 7 years of education in case of vocational track and strictly
more than 6 years of education if enrolled in all other educational programs
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Table 3 Correspondence between educational level and worker’s function
Function undertaken 6 years after graduationa
Low educated High educated
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Blue collar 1,193 62.72 62.72 184 10.93 10.93
White collar 390 20.5 83.23 1,193 70.84 81.77
Functionary 68 3.58 86.8 105 6.24 88
Missing 251 13.2 100 202 12 100
Total 1,902 100 1,684 100
Prevalent function undertaken up to 6 years after graduationb
Low educated High educated
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Blue collar 1,346 70.77 70.77 235 13.95 13.95
White collar 401 21.08 91.85 1,337 79.39 93.35
Functionary 53 2.79 94.64 36 2.14 95.49
Missing 102 5.36 100 76 4.51 100
Total 1,902 100 1,684 100
a It refers to the type of function undertaken at potential experience 6
b It refers to the function undertaken more than 50% of the time from graduation up to potential experience 6. 70% of low
educated are prevalently employed as blue collars while this figure is only 14% for the high educated. Thus, there is clear
correspondence between low educated and blue collar workers and between high educated and white collar workers
than 12 months (6 months for a student graduating in June). By contrast, potential expe-
rience one runs from January until December of the subsequent calendar year, thereby
lasting 12 months. Subsequent potential experience years are defined similarly.
The regressor of interest is the percentage of hours spent in non-employment at poten-
tial experience 0–2, relative to potential total hours if one would work full-time during
the whole period.We express everything in hours because this is the smallest unit of mea-
surement used in the administrative data (it is used to measure time worked in part-time
employment). The reference period is computed considering the entire calendar year for
potential experience one and two and the part of the calendar year following the month
of graduation for potential experience zero. That is, for one who graduated in June, the
time spent working at potential experience 0–2 is divided by the total working hours in
30 months of full-time salaried employment.
Define a as the total hours worked (including self-employment) at potential experience
0–2 and b the potential total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period;
Table 4 Number of individuals by graduation year and province of residence at graduation
Low educated
grad_year prov1 prov2 prov3 prov4 prov5 Total
1994 30 9 31 48 25 143
1995 47 22 44 48 48 209
1996 84 45 65 85 38 317
1997 78 41 65 67 36 287
1998 111 46 78 90 61 386
1999 99 42 47 64 47 299
2000 56 18 30 28 31 163
2001 26 8 11 17 18 80
2002 10 3 0 2 3 18
Total 541 234 371 449 307 1902
The analysis considers the graduation period 1994–2002 for the low educated. The combination g2002 & prov3 is excluded since
empty. The province of residence is measured on December 31 of each year between the year in which the individual turns 17
and 2010. Provinces of residence at graduation are in the following order from 1 to 5: Antwerp, Flemish Brabant, Western
Flanders, Eastern Flanders, Limburg. Each combination of graduation year and province of residence at graduation represents a
cluster gp in the main analysis
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of individual control variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
Birth cohort76 1902 0.33 0.47 0 1 1 if born in 1976
Birth cohort78 1902 0.33 0.47 0 1 1 if born in 1978
Birth cohort80 1902 0.34 0.47 0 1 1 if born in 1980
Live in single-parent 1902 0.12 0.33 0 1 1 if live with single parent at age17(Dec)
Not live with parents 1902 0.06 0.24 0 1 1 if not live with either parents at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 0–11 1902 0.25 0.62 0 7 nr of other HH members aged0–11 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 12–17 1902 0.51 0.69 0 7 nr of other HH members aged12–17 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 18–29 1902 0.52 0.73 0 8 nr of other HH members aged18–29 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 30–64 1902 1.89 0.40 0 5 nr of other HH members aged30–64 at age17(Dec)
HH members aged 65+ 1902 0.04 0.21 0 2 nr of other HH members aged65+ at age17(Dec)
Father education 1902 4.59 3.20 0 13 Father completed education since age12
Mother education 1902 4.21 3.06 0 13 Mother completed education since age12
Years of delay in sec.edu 1902 0.83 0.84 –1 4 Years of delay at age17(Aug)
General education 1902 0.11 0.31 0 1 1 if general edu at age17(Aug)
Technical education 1902 0.38 0.49 0 1 1 if technical edu at age17(Aug)
Vocational education 1902 0.41 0.49 0 1 1 if vocational edu at age17(Aug)
Apprenticeship/PT edu 1902 0.10 0.30 0 1 1 if apprenticeship/PT edu at age17(Aug)
The statistics are reported for the sample of interest, i.e. the low educated graduating in the period 1994–2002
then the regressor of interest is computed as 100 ∗ (b − a)/b. Below we explain in detail
how these components are constructed.
1. Construct a according to the following steps.
I. a is mostly based on the total hours worked in salaried employment and
the date of registration and cancellation from the self-employment register
based on administrative data. Since hours worked are not available for
self-employment, we assume that the latter work as much as a full-time
salaried worker: i.e. 5 days per week and 8 hours per day until 2002 and 5
days per week and 7.6 hours per day from 2003 onwards. This is due to
the introduction of a new law that changed the daily working hours from
8 to 7.6 since January 2003 in Belgium. Whenever one combines
self-employment and salaried-employment in the same quarter, we make
the same assumption so that the hours worked do not exceed the bounds.
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of outcomes measured at potential experience 6
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Label
Continuous outcomes in level
Earnings 1902 19277.29 10978.69 1 47551 Yearly gross earnings from salaried empl.+1
Hours worked 1902 1390.923 725.0779 1 2265 Yearly hours worked in salaried empl.+1
Continuous outcomes in log
Log earnings 1902 8.42 3.59 0 10.77 Log (yearly gross earnings from salaried empl.+1)
Log hours worked 1902 6.20 2.67 0 7.73 Log (yearly hours worked in salaried empl.+1)
Binary outcomes
Self-empl. 1902 0.12 0.33 0 1 1 if only pos. earnings from salaried (& not self-empl)
Salaried empl. 1902 0.84 0.37 0 1 1 if registered as self-empl.
Overall empl. 1902 0.96 0.20 0 1 1 if pos.earnings from salaried or registered as self-empl.
Endogenous regressor
Early non-empl. 1902 30.60 29.65 0 100 % hours not worked relative to FT salaried empl.
The statistics are reported for the sample of interest, i.e. the low educated graduating in the period 1994–2002. The employment
indicators are related as follows: salaried employment + self -employment = overall employment. For continuous outcomes we
add value one before taking the log, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes
equal to zero after the logarithmic transformation
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II. The construction of a requires an additional adjustment due to the
limited availability of the administrative data, which cover the period
1998–2010. Since the sample contains 3 birth cohorts (1976, 1978, 1980)
and that compulsory education ends at age 18 in Belgium, these data can
be used in the following cases (68.5% of the final sample): all individuals
born in 1980, those born in 1978 graduating at least at age 20 and those
born in 1976 graduating at least at age 22. Figure 2 summarises the
availability of the data. To retain in the analysis students born in 1976
graduating between ages 18–21 as well as students born in 1978
graduating between ages 18–19 (which correspond to 31.5% of the final
sample), we exploit the monthly working status from the Sonar database
and impute the values of a following the procedure used for self-employed
workers. That is, for each month in which the individuals are working
according to Sonar, we attribute the working hours of a full-time salaried
worker: i.e. 8 working hours per day until 2002 and 7.6 working hours per
day strictly after 2002. For the entire observation period, we consider 21.6
working days per month (assuming 65 working days in a quarter gives
21.6 working days per month: 21.6 × 3 = 65).
2. Construct b. Recall that it is defined as the potential total hours if one wold work
full-time during potential experience 0–2. As for a, we consider a full-time working
regime of 5 days per week and 8 hours per day until 2002 as well as 5 days per week
and 7.6 hours per day from 2003 onwards. This gives a total of 2,080 annual working
hours until 2002 (8 hours/day × 65 days/quarter × 4 quarters/year) and 1,976
annual working hours from 2003 onwards (7.6 hours/day × 65 days/quarter ×
4 quarters/year).
3. The regressor of interest is computed as (b− a)/b ∗ 100 and hence ranges between
[0, 100]. In some cases (10% of the final sample) this percentage is negative because
of overtime work. Therefore, it is censored at zero.
Fig. 2 Availability of data for the construction of the endogenous regressor of interest, i.e. early
non-employment. In year 1998, birth cohorts 76, 78 and 80 are aged 22, 20 and 18, respectively. Birth cohort
76 and 78 turn age 18 in 1994 and 1996, respectively
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C Complete results
Table 7 Complete estimations on continuous outcomes
Second stage on continuous outcomes First stage
Outcomesa Log earnings Log hours worked Early non-empl.
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Clustered standard errors: g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UR_grad 5.4615***
(1.6848)
Early non-empl. –0.0269*** –0.1002*** –0.0203*** –0.0723***
(0.0040) (0.0291) (0.0029) (0.0207)
UR_pe6 0.4823** 0.4172** 0.3341** 0.2880** 0.3779
(0.1904) (0.1919) (0.1382) (0.1392) (1.6071)
lin_grad_year –0.1588 0.0469 –0.1139 0.0319 3.5329
(0.2945) (0.2995) (0.2134) (0.2191) (2.2946)
lin_grad_year|trend >3 0.9033** 0.6407 0.6676** 0.4814 –4.4281
(0.4003) (0.4242) (0.2915) (0.3109) (2.8479)
lin_grad_year|trend >6 –0.4604* –0.4394 –0.3335* –0.3186 3.9169
(0.2582) (0.2852) (0.1866) (0.2036) (3.1378)
d_province2 –1.3812* –1.2603 –0.9479* –0.8622 3.6574
(0.7107) (0.9544) (0.5041) (0.6684) (8.6769)
d_province3 –2.1753*** –2.9226*** –1.5774*** –2.1070*** –11.7452
(0.6066) (0.9315) (0.4344) (0.6703) (8.9621)
d_province4 0.0841 0.1824 0.0740 0.1436 0.7495
(0.4801) (0.4983) (0.3504) (0.3570) (4.7080)
d_province5 0.8990 0.9210 0.6674 0.6829 –15.1893**
(0.6099) (0.6721) (0.4495) (0.4866) (6.6042)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.0498 0.0410 0.0349 0.0287 0.0774
(0.1386) (0.1413) (0.1019) (0.1024) (0.9931)
lin_calend_year_prov3 0.0723 0.1638 0.0588 0.1236 2.2624
(0.1136) (0.1441) (0.0811) (0.1040) (1.7325)
lin_calend_year_prov4 –0.0946 –0.1524 –0.0684 –0.1094 –1.0198
(0.1267) (0.1477) (0.0927) (0.1051) (1.2618)
lin_calend_year_prov5 –0.0813 –0.0760 –0.0593 –0.0555 1.8419
(0.1067) (0.1194) (0.0795) (0.0868) (1.1761)
avg_UR_pe3-6 –1.2836*** –1.4348** –0.9652*** –1.0724*** –0.3037
(0.4509) (0.5863) (0.3262) (0.4140) (4.4775)
Min_UR_pe0-6 –0.5718 –0.4848 –0.3128 –0.2511 –6.4742
(0.6219) (0.6613) (0.4391) (0.4664) (7.1097)
Birth cohort76 0.7043 –0.3300 0.5421 –0.1909 –13.2641***
(0.5632) (0.7686) (0.4125) (0.5583) (3.6802)
Birth cohort78 0.4261 –0.0504 0.3188 –0.0190 –5.9156**
(0.3677) (0.4687) (0.2691) (0.3409) (2.5815)
Live in single-parent 0.3453 0.7897 0.2731 0.5880 6.1392
(0.4632) (0.5207) (0.3466) (0.3840) (4.1354)
Not live with parents 0.4272* 0.5203 0.3476* 0.4136 1.0913
(0.2431) (0.3501) (0.1792) (0.2530) (2.5611)
HH members aged 0-11 –0.0177 0.0846 –0.0462 0.0263 1.3007
(0.1123) (0.1472) (0.0878) (0.1069) (1.1570)
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Table 7 Complete estimations on continuous outcomes (Continued)
HH members aged 12–17 0.1680 0.1467 0.1261 0.1110 –0.2429
(0.1177) (0.1473) (0.0883) (0.1087) (0.9030)
HH members aged 18–29 0.0112 0.2054 0.0073 0.1449 2.6587**
(0.1164) (0.1561) (0.0870) (0.1134) (1.0291)
HH members aged 30–64 –0.0334 –0.0801 –0.0112 –0.0443 –0.4836
(0.4065) (0.4287) (0.3022) (0.3129) (3.2574)
HH members aged 65+ –0.0680 0.0308 –0.0289 0.0411 1.2468
(0.3639) (0.4196) (0.2683) (0.3079) (3.1042)
Father education 0.0011 0.0294 0.0000 0.0201 0.3816
(0.0255) (0.0330) (0.0188) (0.0240) (0.2531)
Mother education –0.1053*** –0.0485 –0.0765*** –0.0363 0.7800**
(0.0356) (0.0432) (0.0269) (0.0317) (0.2925)
Years of delay in sec. edu –0.0545 0.3485* –0.0423 0.2433 5.4123***
(0.1112) (0.2094) (0.0808) (0.1510) (1.1119)
Technical edu 0.4431 –0.4557 0.3563 –0.2807 –11.8663***
(0.3274) (0.4733) (0.2470) (0.3399) (2.9533)
Vocational edu 0.4572 –0.3520 0.3675* –0.2059 –10.6291***
(0.2772) (0.4516) (0.2101) (0.3233) (3.3428)
Apprenticeship/PT edu –0.1879 –1.1341* –0.1093 –0.7798* –12.5300**
(0.4530) (0.6234) (0.3375) (0.4500) (4.7050)
Constant 15.0564*** 18.1335*** 10.7790*** 12.9598*** 24.5592
(3.7529) (5.2571) (2.6949) (3.7277) (49.3992)
Observations 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902
R-squared 0.0895 –0.2401 0.0895 –0.2099 0.1070
F stat of first stepb 10.51
Exogeneity test P-valc 0.00970 0.0112
Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1–4 report the results from estimating Eq. (2) by OLS (odds columns) and 2SLS
(even columns). Column 5 reports OLS results from estimating the first stage. All estimations report cluster-robust standard errors
by graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p (G = 44). Column 5 reports the
F statistic of the first stage and even columns report the exogeneity test for early non-employment (y0it1)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aContinuous outcomes are measured at potential experience 6; early non-employment is measured at potential experience 0–2.
For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the logarithm, so that those who are not salaried employed at the
moment of evaluation are included with outcomes equal to zero after the logarithmic transformation
bThis statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters. The corrected value resulting from the bootstrap procedure is 9.25
(see Table 1)
cWith clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for
the equation where y0it1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
it1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that
y0it1 is exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ
2(1). This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters
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Table 8 Complete estimations on binary outcomes
Second stage
Outcomes:a Salaried empl. Self-empl. Overall empl.
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Clustered standard errors: g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early non-empl. –0.00169*** –0.00256 0.00054 0.00248 –0.00115*** –0.00008
(0.00041) (0.00290) (0.00041) (0.00258) (0.00025) (0.00151)
UR_pe6 0.00481 0.00404 0.01081 0.01253 0.01562 0.01657*
(0.02385) (0.02209) (0.01947) (0.01765) (0.01020) (0.00999)
lin_grad_year –0.00253 –0.00009 –0.01367 –0.01911 –0.01621 –0.01920
(0.03120) (0.03028) (0.02544) (0.02343) (0.01397) (0.01340)
lin_grad_year|trend >3 0.02993 0.02680 0.00338 0.01032 0.03331* 0.03712**
(0.04020) (0.04043) (0.03029) (0.02903) (0.01832) (0.01813)
lin_grad_year|trend >6 –0.01720 –0.01695 0.01884 0.01829 0.00164 0.00134
(0.02568) (0.02477) (0.02503) (0.02252) (0.01457) (0.01375)
d_province2 –0.22288** –0.22144** 0.17666* 0.17347** –0.04621 –0.04797
(0.09844) (0.09548) (0.09049) (0.08719) (0.04174) (0.03996)
d_province3 –0.17150*** –0.18038*** 0.13845** 0.15820** –0.03304 –0.02218
(0.06193) (0.06407) (0.06588) (0.06577) (0.03720) (0.04285)
d_province4 –0.11409** –0.11292** 0.10736** 0.10477** –0.00673 –0.00816
(0.04892) (0.04910) (0.04459) (0.04794) (0.02450) (0.02611)
d_province5 0.04132 0.04158 –0.06171 –0.06229 –0.02039 –0.02071
(0.06183) (0.06032) (0.04557) (0.04483) (0.03418) (0.03449)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.01976 0.01966 –0.01544 –0.01521 0.00432 0.00445
(0.01597) (0.01524) (0.01253) (0.01214) (0.00565) (0.00651)
lin_calend_year_prov3 –0.00496 –0.00387 0.00501 0.00259 0.00005 –0.00128
(0.01207) (0.01140) (0.01565) (0.01376) (0.00716) (0.00690)
lin_calend_year_prov4 0.01299 0.01231 –0.01369 –0.01217 –0.00070 0.00014
(0.01118) (0.01157) (0.00964) (0.01055) (0.00642) (0.00679)
lin_calend_year_prov5 –0.00608 –0.00602 0.01656 0.01642* 0.01048** 0.01041**
(0.01074) (0.01027) (0.01012) (0.00967) (0.00471) (0.00491)
avg_UR_pe3-6 –0.08309** –0.08489** 0.03333 0.03733 –0.04976* –0.04756*
(0.04062) (0.04005) (0.03418) (0.03230) (0.02622) (0.02516)
Min_UR_pe0-6 –0.01193 –0.01089 0.00452 0.00222 –0.00741 –0.00867
(0.06247) (0.05970) (0.05849) (0.05672) (0.02769) (0.02854)
Birth cohort76 0.00488 –0.00741 0.01471 0.04204 0.01959 0.03462
(0.04397) (0.06402) (0.03588) (0.05434) (0.02535) (0.03517)
Birth cohort78 0.02309 0.01743 –0.00086 0.01173 0.02223 0.02916
(0.03666) (0.04407) (0.03059) (0.03645) (0.01745) (0.02152)
live in single-parent –0.00309 0.00220 –0.03561 –0.04736 –0.03870 –0.04516
(0.05525) (0.05471) (0.05233) (0.05472) (0.03217) (0.03371)
Not live with parents 0.02521 0.02631 –0.01502 –0.01748 0.01019 0.00883
(0.02900) (0.02995) (0.02753) (0.03031) (0.01581) (0.01592)
HH members aged 0–11 –0.00246 –0.00124 0.00596 0.00325 0.00350 0.00201
(0.01217) (0.01251) (0.01277) (0.01265) (0.00574) (0.00627)
HH members aged 12–17 0.02291* 0.02265* –0.01252 –0.01196 0.01039 0.01070
(0.01185) (0.01173) (0.01041) (0.01069) (0.00709) (0.00683)
HH members aged 18–29 0.00009 0.00240 0.00374 –0.00139 0.00384 0.00101
(0.01152) (0.01355) (0.01034) (0.01150) (0.00604) (0.00688)
HH members aged 30–64 –0.01697 –0.01752 –0.02276 –0.02152 –0.03972 –0.03904
(0.05212) (0.05087) (0.04874) (0.04896) (0.02847) (0.02961)
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Table 8 Complete estimations on binary outcomes (Continued)
HH members aged 65+ –0.02001 –0.01884 0.00730 0.00469 –0.01271 –0.01414
(0.04165) (0.04136) (0.03573) (0.03540) (0.02182) (0.02205)
Father education –0.00132 –0.00099 0.00045 –0.00030 –0.00087 –0.00128
(0.00198) (0.00226) (0.00202) (0.00213) (0.00160) (0.00170)
Mother education –0.00971*** –0.00904** 0.00937*** 0.00787** –0.00034 –0.00116
(0.00341) (0.00417) (0.00294) (0.00327) (0.00181) (0.00210)
Years of delay in sec.edu 0.00440 0.00919 –0.02391** –0.03456* –0.01952*** –0.02537*
(0.01275) (0.02067) (0.01070) (0.01764) (0.00702) (0.01381)
Technical edu 0.01038 –0.00031 0.02957 0.05333 0.03995*** 0.05301**
(0.03694) (0.04459) (0.03180) (0.04181) (0.01452) (0.02678)
Vocational edu 0.00818 –0.00144 0.03776 0.05914 0.04594*** 0.05770**
(0.03164) (0.04096) (0.02700) (0.04065) (0.01546) (0.02569)
Apprenticeship/PT edu –0.06240 –0.07366 0.08533* 0.11033** 0.02292 0.03667
(0.05336) (0.06364) (0.04311) (0.05434) (0.02842) (0.03967)
Constant 1.41749*** 1.45409*** –0.15519 –0.23651 1.26230*** 1.21757***
(0.35242) (0.37325) (0.32471) (0.34533) (0.20910) (0.22952)
Observations 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,902
R-squared 0.04170 0.03730 0.03098 0.00332 0.05818 0.03540
Exogeneity test P-valb 0.767 0.438 0.467
Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1–6 report the results from estimating Eq. (2) by OLS (odds columns) and 2SLS
(even columns). The first stage regression is reported in Table 7 (Column 5). All estimations report cluster-robust standard errors
by graduation year g and province of residence at graduation p (G = 44). Even columns report the exogeneity test for early
non-employment (y0it1 ), which is measured at potential experience 0–2
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aThe binary outcomes are measured at potential experience 6
bWith clustered standard errors, the exogeneity test is defined as the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for
the equation where y0it1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
it1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that
y0it1 is exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ
2(1). This statistic is not corrected for the problem of few clusters
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D Sensitivity analysis
Table 9 Effect of interest excluding URp andminURpt from the specification
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
Standard errorsa Robust Cluster g ∗ p Robust Cluster g ∗ p
Outcomes:b (1) (2) (3) (4)
Salaried employment coeff –0.00169*** –0.00169*** –0.00199 –0.00199
se (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00387) (0.00348)
P-val 0.00019 0.57020
Bootstrap P-valc 0.00000 0.62462
Exogeneity test P-vald 0.937 0.931
Self-employment coeff 0.00054* 0.00054 0.00219 0.00219
se (0.00030) (0.00041) (0.00340) (0.00313)
P-val 0.19253 0.48668
Bootstrap P-val 0.19219 0.52853
Exogeneity test P-val 0.619 0.587
Overall employment coeff –0.00115*** –0.00115*** 0.00020 0.00020
se (0.00021) (0.00025) (0.00229) (0.00164)
P-val 0.00005 0.90232
Bootstrap P-val 0.00000 0.91291
Exogeneity test P-val 0.540 0.386
Log earnings coeff –0.0269*** –0.0269*** –0.0947** –0.0947***
se (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0447) (0.0354)
P-val 2.78E-08 0.01051
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.03003
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0361
Log hours worked coeff –0.0203*** –0.0203*** –0.0666** –0.0666***
se (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0326) (0.0251)
P-val 1.05E-08 0.01105
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.03403
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0481
Panel B: Effect of the instrument from the first stage (OLS)
Outcome: Standard errors: Robust Cluster (g*p)
Early non-empl. Coeff 5.0319*** 5.0319***
se (1.6519) (1.7139)
P-val 0.0053
Bootstrap P-val 0.0120
F stat 8.620
Bootstrap F state 5.84
Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in Eq. (2), excluding URp andminURpt . β is the
effect of one pp increase in y0it1 , i.e. the % of hours spent in non-employment at potential experience 0–2 relative to potential
total hours if one would work full-time during the whole period. For clustered standard errors, we report the
P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column 1–2 (3–4) show OLS (2SLS). In 2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at
graduation is used as instrument for y0it1. Panel B reports the effect of the instrument on y
0
it1
in the first stage and the
corresponding F statistic
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aRobust indicates heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Clusters are defined by graduation year g and province of residence at
graduation p (G=44 clusters)
bThe outcomes are measured at potential experience 6. For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so
that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes equal to zero after the logarithmic
transformation
cComputed according to the wild bootstrap procedure proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010) for 999 repetitions
dWith clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation
where y0it1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
it1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0it1 is
exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ2(1)
eBootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the Bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: with G = 44, t2(G − 1) = F(1,G − 1)
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Table 10 Effect of interest for graduation period 1998–2002
Panel A: Effect of early non-employment in the structural equation:
OLS 2SLS
Standard errorsa Robust Cluster g ∗ p Robust Cluster g ∗ p
Continuous outcomes:b (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log earnings coeff –0.0287*** –0.0287*** –0.1406** –0.1406**
se (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0666) (0.0597)
P-val 6.09E-06 0.027298462
Bootstrap P-valc 0 0.082082082
Exogeneity test P-vald 0.0306
Log hours worked coeff –0.0215*** –0.0215*** –0.1032** –0.1032**
se (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0492) (0.0439)
P-val 3.23E-06 0.027651497
Bootstrap P-val 0 0.078078078
Exogeneity test P-val 0.0318
Panel B: Effect of the instrument in the first stage : OLS
Outcome: Standard errors: Robust Cluster (g*p)
Early non-empl.(% hours) Coeff 11.9484*** 11.9484***
se (3.4994) (3.4918)
P-val 0.00233
Bootstrap P-val 0.07007
F stat 11.70921
Bootstrap F state 3.60923
Standard errors between parentheses. Panel A reports results from estimating β in Eq. (2). β is the effect of one pp increase in y0it1 ,
i.e. the % of hours spent in non-employment at potential experience 0–2 relative to potential total hours if one would work
full-time during the whole period. For clustered standard errors, we report the P-value and the wild bootstrap P-value. Column
1–2 (3–4) show OLS (2SLS). In 2SLS the provincial unemployment rate at graduation is used as instrument for y0it1. Panel B shows
the effect of the instrument on y0it1 in the first stage and the corresponding F statistic
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aRobust indicates heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Clusters are defined by graduation year g and province of residence at
graduation p (G=24 clusters)
bThe outcomes are measured at potential experience 6. For continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so
that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation are included with outcomes equal to zero after the logarithmic
transformation
cComputed according to the wild bootstrap procedure proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010) for 999 repetitions
dWith clustered standard errors, this test is defined as the difference between two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation
where y0it1 is treated as endogenous and one for the equation where y
0
it1
is treated as exogenous. Under the null that y0it1 is
exogenous, the statistic is distributed as χ2(1)
eBootstrap F statistic is the F statistic corresponding to the bootstrap P-value of the t statistic of the instrument: we rely on the
equivalence between F and t distribution: t2(G − 1) = F(1,G − 1), with G = 24
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Table 11 Complete OLS: period 1994–2002 vs 1998–2002; full vs restricted specification
Continuous outcomesa: Log earnings Log hours worked
g94-02b g98-02c g94-02 g98-02
full spec.d Restricted spec.e Full spec. Restricted spec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cluster g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p g ∗ p
Early non-empl (% hours) –0.027*** –0.027*** –0.029*** –0.020*** –0.020*** –0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
UR_pe6 0.482** 0.617*** 0.594 0.334** 0.432*** 0.445
(0.190) (0.179) (0.544) (0.138) (0.130) (0.393)
lin_grad_year –0.159 –0.114 0.811* –0.114 –0.082 0.635*
(0.294) (0.284) (0.460) (0.213) (0.205) (0.333)
lin_grad_year|trend >3 0.903** 0.661* –1.032 0.668** 0.492* –0.795
(0.400) (0.360) (0.701) (0.292) (0.260) (0.503)
lin_grad_year|trend >6 –0.460* –0.334*
(0.258) (0.187)
avg_UR_pe3-6 –1.284*** –0.826** –1.879 –0.965*** –0.634** –1.481
(0.451) (0.394) (1.373) (0.326) (0.289) (0.993)
min_UR_pe0-6 –0.572 –0.692 –3.140*** –0.313 –0.398 –2.204**
(0.622) (0.590) (1.118) (0.439) (0.419) (0.791)
d_province2 –1.381* –0.913 –4.627*** –0.948* –0.612 –3.214**
(0.711) (0.704) (1.597) (0.504) (0.503) (1.169)
d_province3 –2.175*** –1.756*** –4.127** –1.577*** –1.275*** –3.024**
(0.607) (0.547) (1.740) (0.434) (0.392) (1.238)
d_province4 0.084 –0.109 –1.617 0.074 –0.069 –1.118
(0.480) (0.456) (1.380) (0.350) (0.333) (0.984)
d_province5 0.899 0.741 1.125 0.667 0.552 0.743
(0.610) (0.609) (1.902) (0.450) (0.451) (1.397)
lin_calend_year_prov2 0.050 0.075 0.126 0.035 0.055 0.064
(0.139) (0.144) (0.307) (0.102) (0.106) (0.228)
lin_calend_year_prov3 0.072 0.147 –0.135 0.059 0.114 –0.105
(0.114) (0.104) (0.137) (0.081) (0.075) (0.094)
lin_calend_year_prov4 –0.095 –0.007 –0.120 –0.068 –0.004 –0.102
(0.127) (0.109) (0.304) (0.093) (0.080) (0.220)
lin_calend_year_prov5 –0.081 –0.102 –0.078 –0.059 –0.075 –0.041
(0.107) (0.107) (0.357) (0.079) (0.080) (0.263)
birth cohort76 0.704 0.813 0.816 0.542 0.622 0.625
(0.563) (0.510) (0.599) (0.413) (0.373) (0.437)
birth cohort78 0.426 0.487 0.471 0.319 0.364 0.353
(0.368) (0.350) (0.353) (0.269) (0.255) (0.256)
HH members aged 0–11 –0.018 0.016 0.005 –0.046 –0.021 –0.027
(0.112) (0.116) (0.136) (0.088) (0.090) (0.103)
Father education 0.001 –0.002 –0.017 0.000 –0.003 –0.014
(0.026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031)
Mother education –0.105*** –0.100*** –0.103** –0.077*** –0.073*** –0.074**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
Years of delay in sec. edu –0.054 –0.143 –0.190 –0.042 –0.106 –0.140
(0.111) (0.096) (0.166) (0.081) (0.071) (0.121)
General edu –0.449 –0.161 –0.361 –0.145
(0.299) (0.353) (0.226) (0.265)
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Table 11 Complete OLS: period 1994–2002 vs 1998–2002; full vs restricted specification (Continued)
Live in single-parent 0.345 0.273
(0.463) (0.347)
Not live with parents 0.427* 0.348*
(0.243) (0.179)
HH members aged 12–17 0.168 0.126
(0.118) (0.088)
HH members aged 18–29 0.011 0.007
(0.116) (0.087)
HH members aged 30–64 –0.033 –0.011
(0.407) (0.302)
HH members aged 65+ –0.068 –0.029
(0.364) (0.268)
Technical edu 0.443 0.356
(0.327) (0.247)
Vocational edu 0.457 0.368*
(0.277) (0.210)
Apprenticeship/PT edu –0.188 –0.109
(0.453) (0.337)
Constant 15.056*** 12.908*** 29.987*** 10.779*** 9.282*** 22.069***
(3.753) (3.432) (7.716) (2.695) (2.454) (5.520)
Observations 1,902 1,902 946 1,902 1,902 946
R-squared 0.090 0.084 0.097 0.089 0.084 0.098
Standard errors between parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 estimate Eq. (2) by OLS considering the graduation period 1994–2002:
they are equivalent to the estimations reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 7. Columns 2 and 5 estimate the restricted
specification discussed for the sensitivity exercise in Section 5.1, based on the graduation period 1994–2002. Columns 3 and 6
estimate the same restricted specification on the graduation period 1998–2002, which is used in the second sensitivity analysis.
Standard errors are clustered by graduation year g and province of living at graduation p
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
aFor continuous outcomes we add value one before taking the log, so that non-salaried employed at the moment of evaluation
are included with outcomes equal to zero after the logarithmic transformation
bGraduation period 1994–2002 considered
cGraduation period 1998–2002 considered: for this reason, the third graduation year spline lin_grad_year|trend > 6 is omitted
dThe full specification corresponds to Eq. (2)
eThe restricted specification is the one used in the second sensitivity analysis in Section 5.1
Additional file
Additional file 1: Supplementary online appendix to “Scars of recessions in a rigid labour market”. Relevant
for this study are (i) Section S.5 of “Additional file 1” which discusses the test for the exogeneity of the timing of
graduation; (ii) Section S.1.5 which provides a description of the unemployment rate series; (iii) Sections S.1, S.2 and
S.3 which provide information on the construction of the variables. (PDF 530 kb)
Abbreviations
IV: Instrumental variable; EPL: Employment protection legislation; STC: Short-time work compensation; UI: Unemployment
insurance; OLS: Ordinary least squares; LFS: Labour force survey; 2SLS: Two-stages least squares; pp: Percentage point.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of European Labor Studies is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author
declares that she has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Bart Cockx, William Parienté, Matteo Picchio, Bruno Van der Linden, Dieter Verhaest, Florian Mayneris and
an anonymous referee for all their valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank the participants to the seminars at
Ghent University (internal seminars) and the participants to the Doctoral Workshop at the Université catholique de
Louvain for their comments. I am grateful to the Cross Roads Bank for Social Security and the “Steunpunt Studie- en
Schoolloopbanen" for the availability of the data. I acknowledge financial support for this project from the Special
Research Fund (“BOF”) of Ghent University, as well as from the National Bank of Belgium (project code 05Y00110). I finally
thank the Belgian Federal Administration Science Policy for its financial support in the project “Age, women and
employment: An evaluation” within the program Society and Future (contract nr. TA/00/044).
Responsible editor: Sara de la Rica
Ghirelli IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:20 Page 33 of 34
Received: 28 April 2015 Accepted: 13 August 2015
References
Angrist JD, Pischke J-S (2009) Mostly harmless econometrics. An empiricist’s companion. Princeton University Press,
Princeton and Oxford
Arulampalam W (2001) Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemployment experiences on wages. Econ J
111(475):585–606
Baltagi B, Kao C, Na S (2013) Testing for cross-sectional dependence in a panel factor model using the wild bootstrap F
test. Stat Pap 54(4):1067–1094
Baum CF, Schaffer ME, Stillman S (2003) Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing. Stata J 3(1):1–31. 31
Beaudry P, DiNardo J (1991) The effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle: evidence
from micro data. J Pol Econ 99(4):665–688
Bell DN, Blanchflower DG (2010) Youth unemployment: Déjà Vu?. IZA Discussion Paper 4705, IZA, Bonn, Germany
Brunner B, Kuhn A (2014) The impact of labor market entry conditions on initial job assignment and wages. J Popul Econ
27(3):705–738
Cameron AC, Gelbach JB, Miller DL (2008) Bootstrap-based improvements for inference with clustered errors. Rev Econ
Stat 90(3):414–427
Cockx B, Ghirelli C (2015) Scars of recessions in a rigid labor market. IZA Discussion Paper 8889, IZA, Bonn, Germany.
Supplementary Online Appendix: http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/Ascars.pdf
Cockx B, Picchio M (2013). Scarring effects of remaining unemployed for long-term unemployed school-leavers J R Stat
Soc Ser A (Statistics in Society) 176(4):951–980
Davidson R, MacKinnon J (2010) Wild bootstrap tests for IV regression. J Bus & Econ Stat 28(1):128–144
Davidson R, MacKinnon JG (2008) Bootstrap inference in a linear equation estimated by instrumental variables. Econ J
11(3):443–477
Devereux PJ, Hart RA (2007) The spot market matters: evidence on implicit contracts from Britain. Scott J Pol Econ
54(5):661–683
Ellwood DT (1982) Teenage unemployment: permanent scars or temporary blemishes? In: Freeman RB, Wise D-A (eds).
The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, Chicago. University of Chicago Press.
pp 349–390
Gangji AV, Plasman R (2007) The Matthew effect of unemployment: how does it affect wages in Belgium. DULBEA
Working Papers 07–19. RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
Gartell M (2009) Unemployment and subsequent earnings for Swedish college graduates. A study of scarring effects.
Arbetsrapport 2009:2, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden
Genda Y, Kondo A, Ohta S (2010) Long-term effects of a recession at labor market entry in Japan and the United States.
J Hum Resour 45(1):157–196
Gervais M, Jaimovich N, Siu HE, Yedid-Levi Y (2014) What should I be when I grow up? Occupations and employment
over the life cycle and business cycle. NBER Working Paper S 20628, NBER, Cambridge, MA
Gregg P (2001) The impact of youth unemployment on adult unemployment in the NCDS. Econ J 111(475):626–653
Gregg P, Tominey E (2005) The wage scar from male youth unemployment. Labour Econ 12(4):487–509
Gregory M, Jukes R (2001) Unemployment and subsequent earnings: estimating scarring among British men 1984–94.
Econ J 111(475):607–625
Hausman J (2001) Mismeasured variables in econometric analysis: problems from the right and problems from the left.
J Econ Perspect 15(4):57–67
Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1):153–161
Kahn LB (2010) The long–term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy. Labour Econ
17(2):303–316
Kawaguchi D, Murao T (2014) Labor market institutions and long-term effects of youth unemployment. IZA Discussion
Paper 8156. J Money Credit Bank 46(S2):95U˝116
Kilponen J, Santavirta T (2010) New evidence on implicit contracts from linked employer–employee data. Scandinavian
J Econ 112(4):864–883
Kletzer LG, Fairlie RW (2003) The long-term costs of job displacement for young adult workers. Ind Labor Relat Rev
56(4):682–698
Lockwood B (1991) Information externalities in the labour market and the duration of unemployment. Rev Econ Stud
58(4):733–53
MacKinnon JG, Webb MD (2015) Wild bootstrap inference for wildly different cluster sizes. Queen’s Economics
Department Working Paper No. 1314, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
Moulton BR (1990) An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate variables on micro units. Rev Econ Stat
72(2):334
Mroz TA, Savage TH (2006) The long–term effects of youth unemployment. J Hum Resour 41(2):259–293
Neumark D (2002) Youth labor markets in the United States: shopping around vs. staying Put. Rev Econ Stat 84(3):462–482
Oreopoulos P, von Wachter T, Heisz A (2012) The short- and long-term career effects of graduating in a recession. Am
Econ J: Appl Econ 4(1):1–29
Oreopoulos, P, von Wachter T, Heisz A (2008) The short- and long-term career effects of graduating in a recession:
hysteresis and heterogeneity in the market for college graduates. IZA Discussion Paper 3578. IZA, Bonn, Germany
Pissarides CA (1992) Loss of skill during unemployment and the persistence of employment shocks. Quarterly J Econ
107(4):1371–1391
Puhani P (2000) The heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. J Econ Surv 14(1):53–68
Schmillen A, Umkehrer M (2013) The scars of youth: effects of early-career unemployment on future unemployment
experience. IAB Discussion Paper 201306. IAB, Nürnberg, Germany
Ghirelli IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:20 Page 34 of 34
Sonar (2003) Hoe maken de jongeren de overgang van school naar werk? Basisrapportering Cohorte 1978 (eerste golf).
Tech. rep. Steunpunt WAV, Leuven, Belgium
Sonar (2004a) Hoe maken de jongeren de overgang van school naar werk? Basisrapportering Cohorte 1976 (tweede
golf). Tech. rep. Steunpunt WAV, Leuven, Belgium
Sonar (2004b) Hoe maken de jongeren de overgang van school naar werk? Cohorte 1980 (eerste golf). Technisch rapport.
Tech. rep. Steunpunt WAV, Leuven, Belgium
Stock J, Yogo M (2005) Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In: Andrews DW (ed). Identification and
Inference for Econometric Models. Cambridge University Press, New York. pp 80–108
Topel RH, Ward MP (1992) Job mobility and the careers of young men. Quarterly J Econ 107(2):439–79
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
